



LESSONS FROM FORT HOOD

DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood (Jan 10)



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INTRODUCTION



On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas.

- 13 people were killed and 45 others wounded or injured
 - 12 Soldiers
 - 1 DOD Contractor
- Two minutes, forty seconds after the initial 911 call, installation first responders arrived on scene
- One-and-a-half minutes later, assailant was incapacitated
- Two ambulances and an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived on scene two minutes and fifty seconds later



OVERVIEW



- Leaders at Ft. Hood had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response plans and exercises
- Base personnel were prepared and trained to take appropriate actions to secure the situation
- The prompt and courageous acts of Soldiers, first responders, local law enforcement, DoD civilians, and healthcare providers prevented greater losses
- Tragedy raised questions about the degree to which the entire Department is prepared for similar incidents in the future – especially multiple, simultaneous incidents
- Defense Secretary Gates directed this independent review



OVERVIEW (Cont)




- Report was to address possible deficiencies in:
 - DOD programs, policies, processes, and procedures related to force protection and identifying DOD employees who could potentially pose credible threats to themselves and others
 - Sufficiency of the DOD's emergency response to mass casualty situations at DOD facilities and the response to care for victims and families in the aftermath
 - Sufficiency of programs, policies, process, and procedures for the support and care of healthcare providers while caring for beneficiaries suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or other mental or emotional wounds and injuries
 - Adequacy of Army programs, policy, processes, and procedures as applied to the alleged perpetrator
- Base personnel were prepared and trained to take appropriate actions to secure the situation



Findings

- Review identified 49 findings
- 76 Recommendations to correct deficiencies
- We will take a look at several





Finding 2.2

- **Finding:** Background checks on personnel entering DOD workforce or gaining access to installations may be incomplete, too limited in scope, or not conducted at all
- **Discussion:** Background checks on civilians entering the military or civilian workforce have a variety of limitations
 - Sealed juvenile records
 - Persons enter before background checks are completed
 - Some workers are not required mandatory background checks
- **Recommendation:**
 - Evaluate the background check policy
 - Review expedited processes for citizenship and clearance to ensure risk is sufficiently mitigated



Finding 2.4

- **Finding:** Limited ability to investigate Foreign National military and civilian personnel who require access to DOD information systems and facilities
- **Discussion:** A number of personnel granted physical access to DOD facilities require some form of vetting
 - Often a one time requirement
 - Records do not exist
 - Only able to conduct the FBI name check, fingerprint check, and check suspected terrorist database
- **Recommendation:** Implement more rigorous standards and procedures for investigating Foreign National DOD employees



Finding 2.6

- **Finding:** Services have programs and policies to address prevention and intervention for suicide, sexual assault, and family violence, but guidance concerning workplace violence and the potential for self-radicalization is insufficient
- **Discussion:** Policies and procedures in DOD or Service level that address workplace violence are not comprehensive
 - Violence prevention portion of the training was removed recently
 - Useful resources for violence prevention education and training exists in other federal agencies but are dated
- **Recommendation:** Integrate existing programs with information on violence and self-radicalization to provide a comprehensive prevention and response



Finding 2.8

- **Finding:** DOD Instructions does not thoroughly address emerging threats, including self-radicalization, which may contribute to an individual's potential to commit violence
- **Discussion:** The absence of an updated and comprehensive policy on emerging threats inhibits the timely update of relevant service regulations
- **Recommendation:** Update DOD Instruction to provide specific guidance for counterintelligence awareness of the full spectrum of threat information, particularly as it applies to behavioral indicators that could identify self-radicalization





Finding 2.13

- **Finding:** Commanders and military healthcare providers do not have visibility on risk indicators of service members who seek care from civilian medical entities
- **Discussion:** In some cases personal data can only be shared with authorized family members which prevents the military medical providers, commanders and supervisors from assisting the service members or intervening
- **Recommendation:** Seek adoption of policies and procedures to ensure thorough and timely dissemination of relevant Service member violence risk indicators from civilian entities



Finding 2.15

- **Finding:** Policy governing prohibited activities is unclear and does not provide commanders and supervisors the guidance and authority to act on potential threats to good order and discipline
- **Discussion:**
 - Policy is limited to active participation in groups that may pose a threat to good order and discipline
 - Does not include contacting, establishing, or maintaining relationships with persons or entities that interfere with or prevent the orderly accomplishment of the mission or present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, mission, and moral
- **Recommendation:** Review prohibited activities and recommend necessary policy changes



Finding 2.16

- **Finding:** Authorities governing civilian personnel are insufficient to support attempts to identify indicators of violence or take actions to prevent violence
- **Discussion:**
 - Many indicators of risk factors associated with violence are not visible, especially outside the workplace
 - Some policies require a supervisor to give at least 24 hr notice before suspending an employee and states 7 days is more typical
 - Authority is insufficient if employee represents an imminent threat
- **Recommendation:** Review civilian personnel policies to determine whether additional authorities or policies would enhance visibility on indicators of possible violence and provide greater flexibility to address behavior of concern



Finding 3.2

- **Finding:** DOD force protection programs and policies are not focused on internal threats
- **Discussion:**
 - The DOD does not have a comprehensive training program focused on internal threats regardless of the target
 - TWG could also address internal threats as part of their normal procedures
- **Recommendation:**
 - Develop policy and procedures to integrate the currently disparate efforts to defend DOD resources and people against internal threats
 - Evaluate existing threat assessment programs
 - Focus on predicting and preventing insider attacks



Finding 3.6

- **Finding:** There are no force protection processes or procedures to share real-time event information
- **Discussion:**
 - No indications that the rest of the CONUS DOD force was immediately notified of the event on Ft Hood
 - Most installations and units first found out about the event through the new media
 - This was a single event, but had it been the first in a series of coordinated, near simultaneous attacks, most other DOD installations and facilities would not have been properly postured for an attack
- **Recommendation:** Evaluate the requirement for creating systems, processes, policy, and tools to share real-time, unclassified force protection information among military installations in CONUS to increase situational awareness and security response



Finding 4.1

- **Finding:** Services are not fully interoperable with all military and civilian emergency management stakeholders
- **Discussion:**
 - The installation Emergency Management program directs the services to adopt the NIMS
 - DOD gave Services until 13 Jan 11 to develop their initial capability and until 13 Jan 14 to have a full Installation Emergency Program aligned with national guidance
 - There are no measures or established milestones in DOD guidance to define initial and full capability
 - Full Operational Capability will be largely based on personal relationships rather than codified procedures
- **Recommendation:**
 - Establish milestones for reaching full operational compliance
 - Assess the potential for accelerating the timeline for compliance



Finding 4.2

- **Finding:** There is no DOD policy implementing public law for 911 capability on DOD installations. Failure to implement policy will deny the military community the same level of emergency response as those communities off base.
- **Discussion:**
 - 911 is not a universal emergency assistance number on DOD installations
 - Not all installations have enhanced 911 capability
 - Some installations have 911 calls going on and off the installations to different dispatch centers depending on the type of phone used
 - Since Ft Hood does not have Enhanced 911 capability, the caller's location and information was unavailable
- **Recommendation:**
 - Develop policy that provides implementation guidance for Enhanced 911 service in accordance with public law



Finding 4.3

- **Finding:** DOD policy does not currently take advantage of successful models for active shooter response for civilian and military law enforcement on DOD installations and facilities
- **Discussion:**
 - DOD has no established process to quickly adopt civilian law enforcement best practices
 - Prior to Columbine that tactic was to isolate and call in special response team
 - Policy departments collectively developed new active shooter response protocols with the goal being to neutralize the threat immediately
 - Ft Hood began training this new protocol about one year from the incident which the responding officers attributed their actions to the new training
- **Recommendation:**
 - Identify and incorporate civilian law enforcement best practices into training certifications for civilian and security guards



Finding 4.4

- **Finding:** Many installations lack mass notification capability
- **Discussion:**
 - DOD instruction requires a mass warning and notification capability with the ability to warn all personnel within 10 min of incident notification at the dispatch center
 - Giant Voice has been the standard for mass notification on DOD installations
 - A more comprehensive approach to mass warning using technology is available (telephone notification, computer desktop notification, personal computing devices, text messaging, and social network sites)
- **Recommendation:**
 - Examine the feasibility of advancing the procurement and deployment of state-of-the-art mass warning systems and incorporate into emergency response plans



Finding 4.5

- **Finding:** Services had not widely deployed or integrated a Common Operational Picture into installation Emergency Operation Centers per DOD direction
- **Discussion:**
 - A common operational picture provides a standardized, continuously updated, multi-user capability to produce reports, mapping, imagery, and real time information sharing between multiple subscribers
 - At Ft Hood multiple reports of gun shots caused commanders to delay the release of children from the local day care center for 6 hrs due to the lack of situational awareness and communication
 - Services need to integrate their Common Operating Picture with technology used by their local community
- **Recommendation:**
 - Examine the feasibility to accelerating the deployment of state-of-the-art Common Operational Picture to support Installation Emergency Operations Center




Finding 4.7

- **Finding:** Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA) between DOD and civilian support agencies across the Services are not current
- **Discussion:**
 - CONUS military installations and their surrounding civilian communities are increasingly interdependent
 - When an emergency or a disaster strikes, it is critical for both parties to rely on established relationships for mutual support
 - The Ft Hood MAA were in place and were helpful in meeting the emergency response requirements. However, they had not been tracked and were not exercised sufficiently to ensure currency and effectiveness resulting in delays in the installation obtaining information on patients taken to civilian hospitals
- **Recommendation:** Review Installation Emergency Management programs to ensure correct guidance on integrating tracking, exercising, and inspections of MAAs



Finding 4.12

- **Finding:** DOD casualty affairs policy, federal law, and DOD mortuary affairs guidance do not exist regarding injury or death of a private citizen with no DOD affiliation on a military installation within the CONUS
- **Discussion:**
 - At Ft Hood one of the fatalities was a DOD contract employee
 - The death of a private citizen in these circumstances would have presented a situation without clear guidance as a notification policy and the provisions of casualty assistance
- **Recommendation:** Review current policies regarding casualty reporting and assistance to the survivors of a private citizen with no DOD affiliation, who is injured or dies on a military installation within the CONUS



WRAP UP

- Critique
- Feedback Forms